The Emergence of Strong Property Rights: Speculation from history by Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










This paper has benefited tremendously from comments by Candice Prendergast. It is partly based on work
with Abhijit Banerjee. Much of this working paper is forthcoming as chapter 6 of Saving Capitalism from
the Capitalists (Crown Business, Random House).  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including notice, is given
to the source.The Emergence of Strong Property Rights: Speculations from History
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales
NBER Working Paper No. 9478
January 2003
JEL No. D23, D72
ABSTRACT
How did citizens acquire rights protecting their property from the depredations of the government?
In this paper, we argue that one important factor strengthening respect for property is how it is
distributed. When there is some specificity associated with property, and property is held by those
who are most productive, the distribution of property becomes relatively easy to defend. By contrast,
when property is owned by those who get rents simply by virtue of ownership, the distribution of
property becomes much harder to defend. We speculate on why some countries have been able to
develop a climate of respect for property rights while others have not.
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A sine qua non for almost any institution of capitalism to work is that the property of 
each citizen be respected. This means more than simply allowing and enforcing each individual’s 
right to own private property: It also means respecting the rule of law more broadly by 
facilitating and enforcing private contracts, preventing arbitrary coercion, and preventing 
arbitrary taxation.  
The critical element in ensuring security of property in most countries today is not how 
covetous other citizens are – a strong government can always beat down the greedy. It is not 
even how rapacious foreign invaders are – warfare in recent times has not typically been 
conducted for the express purpose of pillaging the property of enemy citizens. The critical 
element in ensuring security of property has been the commitment of a country’s government to 
respect the property rights of its own citizens. 
Some countries have come a long way. The United States or the United Kingdom, models 
of rectitude in their respect for property today, routinely expropriated wealthy creditors in the 
past. Others are less respectful today than in the past, suggesting that governments do not have 
permanent sinecures on their ability to commit to respect their citizens’ property. Despite Rome 
being the cradle of law, and Venice the source of much innovation historically in business 
contracting, Italy today lags considerably behind some of its northern neighbors in measures of 
respect for the rule of law and respect for property. So if it is not something immutable in a 
people’s culture or psyche that causes them collectively to agree to respect property, what is it? 
Should citizens in developed countries be worried about whether their governments will continue 
to respect property? We seek an answer in this paper. 
   3
The Main Argument  
A property right is a form of monopoly. It gives the owner of an asset the exclusive right 
to use the asset and exclude others from its use. But what gives the owner this right? We might 
be tempted to answer: “The Law”. While it is true that in modern developed societies, property 
rights are enforced by the legal system, this answer begs the question of what gives the law 
force. Why in certain countries is the law respected and enforced, even against the might of the 
government, while in others it is not?  
One possible explanation is the nature of the government.  Some have argued that by 
constitutionally enhancing the “countervailing” power of parliament and the judiciary, a 
government can offer a credible commitment to not expropriate its citizens.
i There is, however, 
something incomplete in the argument that the government can show its commitment to respect 
property by setting up a more democratic political process, which keeps the arbitrary powers of 
the government in check. At the national level, most rules can be changed. The government can 
dispense with the democratic political process. Political power is therefore not easily conferred 
by legislative fiat or a change in the constitution. It is more fruitful to think of the devolution of 
political power and the security of property not as a political or legal phenomenon alone, but 
partly as an economic phenomenon. This is the approach we take.  
To do so we need to go back in time, when legal enforcement was doubtful even in 
countries where property is now well respected, and understand, step by step, how basic respect 
for property emerged. To root ourselves firmly in facts, we will examine how England moved in 
little over a hundred years from being a state under an arbitrary despot to being ruled by a 
constitutional monarchy. Before we do so, however, it is useful to preview the logic of our 
argument.    4
A property right is much more defensible when the owner manages the property much 
better than anyone else. There is a substantial cost to taking the property away, for the owner’s 
skills would no longer be available – certainly to the extent it was earlier -- for generating value 
with the property. Thus property that is owned by those who can manage it best is property that 
not only has the law to support it, but also has economic value backing it. To the extent that the 
government respects economic value, either because of the power it can purchase, or the taxes it 
can pay, an economically efficient distribution of ownership is much more secure than a 
distribution based on the accident of history or on the whims of the king.
 ii 
A political institution like parliament is not irrelevant here. To the extent that owners are 
dispersed, parliament can help them gather and coordinate their actions. But democratic 
institutions are an instrument, not the source, of their power. This is not just a matter of 
semantics. With the “wrong” distribution of property, a country will find it very hard to achieve 
the right balance between the power of the government and the power of the people, no matter 
how many democratic institutions it has.   
At this point all this may seem just conjecture, but we will now substantiate it. We will 
examine why respect for property rights emerged when it did in England and why it took so long 
for other countries to follow England’s footsteps. While mainly historical, our analysis is 
relevant today, not just for countries like Russia that are attempting to establish secure property 
rights for their citizens, but also for countries where property is secure today, so that its 
continued security can be assured.  
The Rapacious Government 
Security of property started with protection from foreign invaders. The generalized 
improvement in standards of living, which occurred in Western Europe from the beginning of the   5
second millennium, is attributable, at least in part, to the security of its Eastern borders, which 
lead to the end of the Barbarian invasions. Thus, military security is an important element of 
economic and financial development. But it is not sufficient. Nor is it true that more military 
security is always better for finance. In fact, within Western Europe, the cities that emerged as 
the most important financial centers (first Florence, Genoa, and Venice, then Hamburg and the 
cities of the Hanseatic League) were not the political capitals of the then military superpowers, 
but independent political entities, very much exposed, with the possible exception of Venice, to 
the risk of foreign invasions. Why did they succeed where Paris, Vienna and Madrid did not?  
A nation’s military might does not necessarily translate into a sense of economic security 
for the citizens. In fact, through much of history it has been quite the opposite. The stronger is a 
government’s military power, the greater is its need for funds to feed and pay its soldiers, and the 
stronger is its temptation to simply take from its own citizens (especially if even-more-tempting-
alien-citizens are not at hand). History is rife with examples of how the rich attracted the 
unwanted attentions of their own powerful monarch.  The fate of the Templars in the early 
fourteenth century offers a salutary warning of what happened when a needy king went up 
against his citizens, no matter how morally and physically powerful they might be. 
The Military Order of the Knights of the Temple of Solomon, better known as the 
Knights Templars were the first significant international bankers. They were recruited largely 
from the younger sons of nobility who stood no chance of inheriting titles or wealth. They 
devoted themselves to the Church, and initially lived near the ruins of the Temple of Solomon in 
Jerusalem, from which they took their name. They took upon themselves the duty of policing the 
highways used by pilgrims going to Jerusalem. Their lives were chaste and austere, and they   6
reserved their passion for warfare. Because they apparently did not fear death, they were among 
the most feared warriors on earth.
iii 
As a result of gifts from the grateful and the faithful, they grew in wealth. They came to 
own some of the strongest castles in the world. Given their military prowess, these served as 
ideal repositories for valuables in those troubled times. King John of England used the London 
Temple as a repository for the crown jewels, and in 1261, his son Henry III, who was in trouble 
with his nobles, felt they would be safer if transferred to the Templar fortress in Paris.
iv 
 These castles formed a network of “branch offices” which meant they could make cash 
available at both ends of the Mediterranean, as well as in Paris or London, when needed and in 
the form that was locally accepted.
v A knight could deposit money in Paris and receive it in the 
appropriate currency in Jerusalem. Crusading knights used this network, the American Express 
of the Crusades, to keep themselves in funds as they traveled. Of course, the Templars charged a 
fee both for the exchange and the transfer. Local banking functions were also performed. A 
number of surviving parchments suggest that the Temple in Paris operated what looks like a 
modern bank’s cash desk, open at pre-specified times, and allowing clients to deposit and 
withdraw money. Clients appeared to be a Who is Who of the time, and included the Royal 
family, important Church officials, nobles, and rich merchants.
vi  
The Templars’ financial functions soon rivaled or exceeded their military functions. They 
were trustees for Crusaders and administered their wills, they acted as revenue agents for various 
monarchs and popes, and they served as financial advisers for the rich and powerful.        
Substantial amounts of money were in Templar vaults at any point in time. 
Unfortunately, while their castles were strong, they were no match for a determined sovereign. In 
1263, during the conflict with Simon of Montfort, Prince Edward of England overcame Templar   7
opposition to enter its treasury. He broke into strong boxes, and seized money belonging to a 
number of barons and merchants. His son, Edward II, did a similar thing on his father’s death. 
Peter III of Aragon broke into the Templar treasury in Perpignan. In fact, the surprising fact is 
not that monarchs violated the Templar strongholds, but that the violations were so few in 
number given the temptations and the impecunious state of royal treasuries. The restraint 
exercised by monarchs over the century and a half of Templar ascendancy must be attributed to 
the moral force exerted by the Templars, as also the concern that a raid demonstrating naked 
greed would undermine their own standing with the church.       
In 1307, Philip IV of France, motivated by the terrible financial state of his economy, and 
having already raised all the money he could through the traditional mediaeval sources of 
debasing the currency and seizing the property of the Lombards or the Jews, turned on the 
Templars. Philip began a propaganda campaign that aimed to strip the Templars of their moral 
standing. Templar leaders were arrested in a surprise raid and were accused of heresy, apostasy, 
devil worship, sexual perversion and a number of other sins against the mediaeval code of 
morality.
vii The Templar leaders confessed under torture, and even though they later recanted, 
they were found guilty and many were burnt at the stake.  
The properties of the Templars were carefully inventoried, lands rented out, and the 
treasury taken over by royal officials. The Church, with no hope of expressing moral outrage, 
decided to join the predators. Pope Clement V abolished the order in 1312 and devoted his 
energies to securing some of its properties for other orders in the Church. Thus Philip succeeded 
in his aim of reducing the moral standing of the Templars, and seizing its assets. But despite his 
protestations otherwise, the act in more commercially minded countries such as Italy was seen as 
one of pure avarice.
viii   8
The lesson from the demise of the Templars, which was repeated time and again, was that 
no agent, however powerful or sacrosanct, could protect wealth against a determined 
government. Interestingly, an important outcome of Philip IV’s depredations was that the Church 
realized the threat monarchs represented to its own property. For this reason, it turned from 
accepting property as a necessary evil (after all, Jesus inveighed against riches) to stoutly 
defending it as an inalienable right. Clerical scholars started to argue that the state did not have 
rights over the property of its subjects, and secular scholars soon took this theme up, finding 
support for it in Roman Law.
ix Perhaps as a result, outright expropriation became more rare in 
Western Europe, and was generally targeted at infidels, such as Arabs or Jews.  
Greed was not the only, nor even the most important, reason why governments coveted 
the wealth of their citizens. They were lead to expropriate their own citizens by their desperate 
needs for funds to finance their military efforts. In the long run, states could fund expenditure 
through taxes. But war brooked no delay. The alternative to confiscating citizens’ wealth was to 
borrow -- an alternative a modern government knows all too well. But this led to a paradox. It is 
both costly and unpopular to levy taxes on the wider population so as to pay a few creditors. One 
reason a government would repay its debt even in the face of these costs is to keep the spigot of 
future financing open. But if it had the ability to persuade a few citizens to put up more when it 
was in need (what in mediaeval times was euphemistically called a forced loan), then it had little 
incentive to repay old loans. Since creditors, as a result, had no punitive power over the 
government, they had no reason to trust the government to repay. This then made it all the more 
certain that the government would renege on any debt contracted in good faith, and resort 
periodically to expropriation, disguised as forced loans or defaults.   9
The easy targets (after the usual suspects like the Jews had been shaken down) were, of 
course, the rich, especially financiers.  The manifest usurer was anathema to the Church, and 
hence accepted prey. Financiers were also likely to keep their wealth in a liquid, and 
conveniently removable form. This is an aspect that makes, even in modern days, financiers the 
likely target of government taxation or expropriation. In this the governments’ logic essentially 
parallels that of the bank robber, Willy Sutton, who when asked why he robbed banks answered, 
“Because that is where the money is”. In an atmosphere of forced loans and repeated defaults, 
finance, not surprisingly, did not flourish.  
The resolution to this paradox was simple. The government had to find a way to make it 
more credible that it would repay. This would then make the route of borrowing and repayment 
via steady taxation more credible. The conventional wisdom is that the Venetian Republic, the 
Netherlands, and in the late seventeenth century, England, managed to devolve power to 
investors -- government in these countries was more representative of the rich investor than were 
the absolute monarchies that prevailed elsewhere.
x  This then made it hard for the government to 
default. The process by which the devolution of power took place is much more controversial. 
To understand why, consider England. 
The Transformation Of the English Monarchy 
The early Tudors, Henry VII and Henry VIII, were among the most rapacious and 
arbitrary monarchs. They had their way with all the institutions of governance that were meant to 
check their power – the aristocracy, the church, the parliament, and even the judiciary. Henry VII 
steadily expropriated the great lords whom he feared as threats to the throne. Henry VIII not only 
continued along his father’s path but in one of the greatest land grabs in history, he dissolved the 
monasteries in England and took over their land, amounting by some estimates to over 30   10
percent of the land holdings in England at that time. This, however, was not enough. In addition, 
the Tudors resorted to repeated “voluntary” loans from rich citizens. Consider the plight of one 
Richard Reed who did not contribute to one of Henry VIII’s levies
xi: 
“The English army was then in the field on the Scots border. Reed was sent down to serve as a 
soldier on his own charge; and the general…received intimations to employ him on the hardest 
and most perilous duty, and subject him, when in garrison, to the greatest privations, that he 
might feel the smart of his folly and sturdy disobedience.”  
 
The Stuarts continued the practice of expropriation. As late as 1672, in the infamous Stop on the 
Exchequer, Charles II suspended debt payments to bankers amounting to about $ 1.3 million 
pounds, at a time when annual Crown income was less than 2 million pounds.
xii  
Yet soon after, England had a constitutional monarchy. In the Glorious Revolution of 
1688, the Stuart King, James II, was overthrown and replaced by William and Mary.  The new 
monarchs agreed to a Declaration of Rights. The Crown recognized the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament and also the need for parliamentary consent for a standing army in peacetime. 
Furthermore, judges were protected from arbitrary dismissal, strengthening individual liberties 
and the property rights of the citizens against the Crown. 
The consequences for the English government’s ability to borrow were extraordinary. In 
1688, government debt was about 1 million pounds, about 2 or 3 percent of GDP. Much of the 
debt was short term (recall that creditors lend only short term if uncertain of the motives of the 
debtor) requiring between 6 and 30 percent a year in interest, at a time when the Dutch 
government was able to borrow long term at 4 percent per year.
xiii By 1697, government debt had 
multiplied 17 times to about 40 percent of GDP, a significant portion of which was long term. 
The proximate cause of the increase in government debt was war with France, but it also 
reflected the greater willingness of investors to supply the government with debt.  Even while   11
government debt mounted, interest rates came down, from 14 percent soon after the revolution to 
about 6 percent in 1697. 
The now conventional explanation is that by constitutionally enhancing the 
“countervailing” power of Parliament and the judiciary, the Crown offered investors the credible 
commitment that it would not attempt to expropriate them.
xiv Parliament represented both the 
moneyed interests of merchants and financiers (the Whigs) and the landed gentry (the Tories). 
Given its composition, the increase in its power as a result of the curbs on the power of the king 
made property and financial contracts much more secure. In turn, investors obtained the 
confidence to invest. Thus, the argument goes, the internal constitutional limitations on the 
English Crown’s powers allowed it to raise large sums at short notice, giving it external strength 
and transforming England into an European nation of the first rank.
xv   
  There is, however, something incomplete in the argument that the government could 
show its commitment to respect property by setting up a more democratic political process, 
which kept the arbitrary powers of the government in check. If it were so easy to offer a credible 
commitment, why did other governments, especially those of other nation states like France and 
Spain that were perpetually in financial need, not do so? 
One possibility is that their situations were different. For instance, it could be argued 
England’s government could be tamed more easily because it had no standing army to carry out 
its arbitrary orders, and finance for raising an army had to be approved by Parliament. Since 
many members of Parliament were also property owners, Parliament was unlikely to approve the 
raising of an army that could be used to expropriate the citizenry. By contrast, the French and 
Spanish kings had standing armies -- external threats were more proximate, and they did not 
have the luxury of time provided by a Channel separating them from their enemies.  Thus, the   12
argument must go, these monarchs could not set up credible internal constraints on the power of 
their governments, even though they too desperately lacked for finance. 
Too much, however, could be made of these differences in geography. It is difficult to 
believe that the absence of a standing army in England was the primary reason for the English 
king to be better able to curb his own powers. After all, even if England, surrounded by seas, was 
not as exposed to sudden foreign attack as France or Spain, the English king did have a smaller 
standing police force to keep internal peace, and did use it to expropriate the citizenry. Or to see 
it another way, even if the constitution mandated that the king needed Parliament’s permission to 
raise an army, he could simply have ignored constitutional niceties once he was allocated the 
funds and turned the army against Parliament. The loyalty of the army would then have 
depended on who could give it a better deal in the long run (After all, Ancient Rome too tried to 
keep popular generals and their armies far from the center of power, but eventually the 
Praetorian Guard chose many of the later Emperors). That the king did not, or could not, attempt 
to turn the army suggests other factors were at work   
Put yet another way, the great lords who surrounded the feudal monarch had powerful 
armies. Yet constitutionally bound government, and respect for property, emerged only after the 
demise of feudalism. Why only then and not before? There seems something missing in the 
argument that governments became better able to borrow by setting up the checks and balances 
on themselves that would curb their own baser instincts. What was the power that bound them?  
Perhaps it is more fruitful to question whether it is possible for any government to set up 
countervailing power, especially the kind set up through constitutions: An alternative view is that 
the interactions between powerful national players are rarely governed by constitutional rules 
since, at the national level, most rules can be changed. Political power is not easily conferred by   13
legislative fiat or a change in the constitution. Instead, it has much deeper roots, some lying in 
the ownership of property itself. It is more fruitful to think of the devolution of political power 
and the security of property as intertwined processes in which secure property eventually became 
the fount of political power.  
Pursuing this line of argument, Parliament did not become powerful in England as a 
result of constitutional changes brought about in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, it was already 
powerful as evidenced by its ability to depose two Stuart kings (Charles I and James II) in quick 
order. This then means that the constitutional changes largely reflected the power relationship 
that pre-existed these changes, while the conflict between the Stuarts and Parliament was only a 
last ditch stand by the king against an inevitable passing of the balance of power. Of course, 
constitutional change made the devolution more secure against reversal. Our point is that it was 
the culmination rather than the source of the transfer of power. Let us now explain.  
The Decline of the Aristocracy and the Rise of the Market 
  A constitution is simply words on a piece of paper, and sometimes not even that. 
Parliament commanded no armies directly. How did it gain more power over the monarchy than 
did the power feudal lords with their loyal retinues who surrounded the mediaeval monarch? To 
see why, we have to delve deeper into history. The first piece of the answer is the decline of the 
great lords. 
  Henry VII, the Lancaster pretender to the throne, defeated Richard III unexpectedly at 
Bosworth Field in 1485, thus ending the War of the Roses between the House of York and the 
House of Lancaster. Given Henry’s questionable claim to the throne, he set about eliminating 
serious threats to it. One way was to directly attack the most powerful of the lords – and since 
power stemmed from land holdings, confiscate their land and sell it off in pieces so that no   14
successor would pose a similar threat. Henry VIII continued this policy, executing among many 
others, the Duke of Buckingham, who was the highest and richest amongst the nobility. The 
Tudors also took care not to create any new concentrations of power: They created no new dukes 
during their reign.
xvi   
  While some of the most powerful lords were dealt with on trumped up charges, not all 
could be eliminated in this way. The source of a lord’s coercive power came from his band of 
armed dependents. Since there was not much of a market for food or land, the surplus produced 
by a lord was used to feed a retinue of servants and marginal tenants.
xvii He offered them 
protection against other roaming bandits (or equivalently in those times, other lords), and rented 
out land to them at low rates. In return, they offered their loyalty and arms to the lord, wearing 
his livery as a sign of their allegiance. The lord used his armed band to intimidate courts, rivals, 
and even the King.  
  To deal with these armed bands, Henry VII passed a series of Acts asserting that the 
prime loyalty of every subject was to him, the king, and not to the subject’s local lord. He 
forbade the employment of royal officials by others. And he started enforcing an old law 
restricting the use of livery to household servants, making examples of those lords who 
continued to maintain a personal militia. 
  In the meantime, there was another equally compelling reason for the lords to disband 
their militias. As the market for food expanded, the surpluses generated by the land could be sold 
instead of given to servants and tenants. Feeding the retinue was no longer free. And as rents for 
land increased, and a market for land sales started flourishing (more on this shortly), lords started 
feeling the true cost of maintaining inefficient but loyal tenants. The more efficient tenants also 
felt the cost of spending time in the service of the lord, rather than in the more profitable   15
occupation of tilling their fields. They much preferred to pay a market rent in cash rather than 
paying a below-market rent and having further feudal obligations. Thus as markets expanded, 
non-market obligations like military service came under pressure, a phenomenon we will see 
again and again under many guises.  
  Moreover, long years of peace under the Tudors left the lord unable to use his militia to 
even fulfill his traditional feudal obligations to the king. As the costs of maintaining militias 
became more apparent and the benefits declined, some lords disbanded their militias. The 
process became self-reinforcing. Since one of the benefits of a militia was protection against the 
militia of other lords, fewer militias meant even fewer benefits. Thus, over time, lords lost their 
coercive power due to pressure from the monarchy and from economic forces. A `Duke of 
Buckingham in the early sixteenth century, with his castles, his armories, and his hundreds of 
armed retainers’, gave way to ‘a Duke of Newcastle in the mid-eighteenth century, with his 
Palladian houses’ and his political connections.
xviii  The Tudors and the market they helped 
create had effectively crushed the coercive power of the aristocracy.      
The Rise of the Squirearchy 
  What took the place of the aristocracy? The great confiscations by the early Tudors 
culminating in the dissolution of the monasteries brought a huge amount of land on the market. 
Some of this land was granted away, but much of it was sold, with great benefit to the Crown’s 
coffers. Because they had a direct interest in the market value of the land, the English monarchs 
amended the law to give buyers better title to the land, allowing them to sell it further if 
necessary. The flourishing market for land had a number of effects in addition to what we noted 
earlier. First, the more prosperous farmers, the ones who generated substantial profits from their 
land, could buy more, while those who did poorly sold their land, or had it seized and sold by   16
creditors. Second, farmers who had scattered strips could consolidate their land holdings and 
manage the consolidated land better.
xix Third, prosperous professional men like lawyers and 
merchants could buy land, the age-old symbol of status, and bring modern management 
techniques to it.
xx Land moved into the hands of more able farmers and more competent 
managers. 
  The consequence was the emergence of an intermediate class between the lord and the 
peasant, the squirearchy (or alternatively, the gentry), which was more intimately involved with 
the land than the former and more apt to take risk with new techniques than the latter. The 
archetypical member
xxi 
“was not tempted by great possessions into the somnolence of the rentier; was less loaded than 
most noble landowners with heavy overhead charges in the shape of great establishments; did his 
work for himself, instead of relying on a cumbrous machine to do it for him; owned, in short, his 
property, instead of being owned by it.” 
 
He was thus much more able to exploit the land he farmed, and much more closely linked 
to it, than either peasant or lord. When landholdings were vast, the skills required to manage that 
land and generate revenues were supervisory skills – the feudal lord employed overseers who 
supervised a steep hierarchy at the bottom of which was the peasant. While the peasant had the 
capacity to get to know the land well and get the most productive value from it, without 
ownership he had little incentive or ability to do so.  In fact, in the early Middle Ages in England, 
and till quite late in other countries, serfs were not allowed to own property, had to pass on their 
earnings to their master, and were bought and sold with the land they tilled.
xxii Moreover, to 
reduce the need for management, the individual peasant often had “no choice of date or of crop; 
he must plough and reap with the rest, and sow the same seed as they.”
xxiii     17
 While the great lord probably was tutored since early childhood to drive overseers and 
supervise his estate, he did not have an intimate relationship with the land – it was too vast for 
any one man to get to know well. Management was often simply the maintenance of tradition, 
which few lords transcended. As a result, the revenues generated from the land did not really 
depend on whether this particular lord owned it, or whether some other person, who was equally 
capable of driving overseers and sticking with custom, owned it. In economic parlance, the 
income from the land to the lord was a pure rent – it derived simply from his ownership of the 
land, and there was little other economic link between the property and the owner. 
Not only was property loosely linked to the lord, the extent of security of property would 
have made little difference to the size of the revenues generated. Since the peasant exerting the 
effort did not own the land, and farmed it at the pleasure of the lord, greater security for the 
lord’s ownership did little for the peasant. Of course, the lord may have had some additional 
incentive to make improvements to the land if he knew his tenure was secure, but given the kind 
of extensive agriculture he practiced, these would not have added substantially to revenues. 
Given all this, the lord owned his extensive holdings only because he had a sufficient 
armed force to bloody the monarch’s nose. If the monarch did not fear questions about his own 
legitimacy when he expropriated other inherited land, if he did not fear that other lords would 
band together against him, and if the resistance this lord could pose to an assault was limited 
because his band had withered away, property could, and would, change hands whenever the 
monarch desired it. The inefficient structure of ownership was itself the cause for the insecurity 
of property. From the perspective of the monarch, one lord was just as good as another, because 
each one’s supervisory skills allowed them to generate approximately the same surplus for   18
taxation. The only security to property was then the favor of the sovereign. Property could 
simply not be secure when the owner was so replaceable. 
The gentleman farmer, owning smaller (but not economically unviable) plots was 
different. First, the very origins of his land, typically acquired through purchase using his own 
accumulated wealth rather than through inheritance or custom, indicated he had a competency 
that was required neither of lord nor of peasant. Second, on land he farmed himself, he was likely 
to make the decisions on what to plant and where, experiment with different crop rotation and 
irrigation techniques, understand how the weather mattered every season and which clump of 
trees provided beneficial shade and so on. Both because he was competent and because he was 
closely involved in managing his land, the gentleman farmer was very effective in exploiting the 
land he farmed. In addition, he would also be more able to rent land out well, since his intimate 
knowledge of the land’s possibilities would allow him to pick appropriate tenants.  
In short, the burgeoning market for land moved land to the highest value user, the 
competent gentleman farmer. And as he became more familiar with it, his ability to generate 
value only increased so that he was, given the circumstances of the times, far and away the most 
economically efficient owner of the land. Unlike the great lord, the intrinsic value of the land he 
owned would be far less if the gentleman farmer were expropriated for his skills would then be 
unavailable to manage it. It would be better for a far-sighted government to negotiate a steady 
tax from each of these farmers than to expropriate any one of them. In addition, security of 
property would enhance the taxes the gentleman farmer would pay because he would then have a 
greater incentive to invest in the land and create value. 
While these economic concerns may not have been foremost in the Tudor monarch’s 
mind, the great lords were. In a further attempt to undercut the power of the lords, the monarchy   19
devolved more and more of the duties of tax collection and dispensing local justice to the 
gentry.
xxiv But this then made the gentry indispensable to the monarch
xxv: 
“The plain truth was the law, as they [the gentry] practiced and understood it, and the local 
administration of England, had made the ordinary life of the country depend at every point on 
them, and hardly at all upon the Crown. The entire machine – law courts, parishes, poor law, city 
and country – could run very well without the king; but it could not run without the gentry. In 
other words, the gentry was essential to the power of the king, but he was not essential to theirs.” 
 
In short, even while the gentry were becoming economically more powerful, they were also 
becoming critical to land administration. From the perspective of the overall productivity of the 
agricultural sector, this was probably a good thing for their administrative indispensability 
enhanced their sense of security in their property, which undoubtedly made them more 
productive, and further reinforced the security of their property. 
The rise of the squirearchy was a steady process. By one count, there were 1,000 esquires 
in Henry VIII’s time, and this number had expanded to 16,000 by Elizabeth’s time (though there 
is a certain latitude in who precisely qualifies as an esquire). There is no doubting the fact that 
the steady rise in productivity of English agriculture dates from the time of the emergence of the 
gentry. Early historians thought it uncontroversial that the emerging gentry were much more 
productive than the lords and peasants they displaced.
xxvi Since then, ideology has embroiled the 
debate on who exactly was responsible for the increase in productivity, though there have been 
recent attempts to use large sample data to extricate the facts from controversy.
xxvii The data 
suggest the emerging gentry in the 16
th and 17
th century did contribute substantially to the 
productivity revolution.
xxviii The wealth of the gentry expanded in tandem. By 1600, it was 
rumored that the gentry were three times richer than the church, nobility and rich peasantry put 
together.
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So the decline of the aristocracy was accompanied by the rise of the squirearchy. We will 
argue that the squirearchy was more able to curb the power of the monarchy than were the great 
lords. How did this happen? After all, the squires were individually less powerful, and 
collectively more dispersed than the great lords. What bound them together against the king? 
Parliament and the Origins of Property  
Large, dispersed, groups have a harder time coordinating actions than narrow focused 
ones, a point we will come back to in later chapters. Despite being numerous and dispersed, 
significant portions of the gentry could come together. The origins of their property gave the 
gentry a common interest in defending it, while Parliament provided the common meeting 
ground where their actions could be coordinated. The gentry were thus able to overcome the 
impediments to collective action that typically plague large groups. Let us explain in greater 
detail.  
In dissolving the monasteries, Henry VIII was taking on the might of Rome. Opposing 
forces could well question the legitimacy of his reign, and could threaten it if given the 
appropriate backing of the Holy Church. He needed allies, and he found them by distributing 
church lands to the gentry so that “being bound by the same ties of private interest, they might 
always oppose any return to the dominion of Rome.”
xxx In the words of a British historian,
xxxi 
“the participation of so many persons in the spoils of ecclesiastical property…was of no slight 
advantage to our civil constitution, strengthening, and, as it were, infusing new blood into the 
territorial aristocracy, who were to withstand the enormous prerogative of the crown. For if it be 
true, as surely it is, that wealth is power, the distribution of so large a portion of the 
kingdom…must have sensibly affected their weight in the balance. Those families…which are 
now deemed the most considerable, will be found, with no great exception…to have acquired no 
small portion of [their estates]…from monastic or other ecclesiastical foundations.” 
 
In consolidating opposition against Rome to protect their own position, therefore, the Tudors 
also consolidated opposition to future kings. Many amongst the gentry were especially wary of   21
monarchs who had Catholic leanings, or who sought ties with other Catholic monarchs.
xxxii The 
troubles faced by King Charles I (executed) and James II (deposed) were in no small part, due to 
this.  
  Parliament provided the coordination the dispersed gentry needed to assert its recently 
acquired economic power. Parliament, historically, had been the institution whose consent the 
King needed to impose new taxes. It was the mechanism by which the King negotiated with his 
principal sources of taxes, and it was not easily dispensed with, especially once the king came to 
rely on the squirearchy to collect his taxes. This does not immediately mean that Parliament 
could stand up to the monarch. The early Tudors exerted almost absolute dominion over 
Parliament.
xxxiii Elizabeth only had to pass the word to Parliament not to discuss a subject for 
them to desist. Her chancellor, on confirming a new speaker of the House of Commons, warned 
him against the House of Commons meddling in any thing touching on ‘her majesty’s person or 
estate, or church government.’
xxxiv His warning was obeyed scrupulously. 
But as the gentry grew in wealth and power, and as they saw signs of revival of 
Catholicism, their opposition strengthened. Parliament had already become fractious towards the 
end of Elizabeth’s reign, complaining vociferously about the creation and sale of monopolies 
over such essentials as salt. By the time of her successor, James I, Parliament was actively voting 
down the King’s proposals and standing up for the right to free speech and the liberties of its 
members. James vainly threatened his Parliament, “I am a man of flesh and blood, and have my 
passions and affections as other men; I pray you do not go too far to move me to do that which 
my power may tempt me unto.”
xxxv But Parliament ignored him.  
A simple economic calculus would explain why Parliament had become so confident. 
Suppose matters came to a head between the King and the Parliament about property or,   22
equivalently, taxes. While honor and custom would sway a few, many citizens, especially those 
who were being recruited to fight, would decide on the basis of their pocket. The newly recruited 
militias would give their loyalty to those that would pay them regularly and well: As the saying 
goes, pecunia nervus belli or money is the sinews of power. The King could promise to declare 
his opponents traitors, seize their lands, and use the proceeds as well as his own wealth to pay 
those who sided with him. Parliament could promise to do the same thing in reverse. So the side 
that would attract the greater following would be the side that could promise the militia greater 
wealth, both of its own and from seizing its opponents.  
For reasons discussed earlier, the gentry were especially good at managing and 
generating wealth from their land. The King and the great lords had no such ties to their land. Far 
less would be lost if the King and the great lords were relieved of their holdings and the gentry 
retained theirs, than if the reverse happened. So the gentry clearly had the ability to promise 
militias more. There were, of course, other factors that added to their ability to attract a 
following. Much of the land tax collection machinery was in the hands of the gentry, so they 
were better prepared to fund the war while it was in progress. Furthermore, they were men with 
strong ties to the local population while the King and lords were remote. The fundamental point, 
however, is that the balance of power had changed. If the monarchy were not far-sighted enough 
to see this, it might indeed take a Civil War, a beheading, and a revolution to convince the 
monarchy that power had indeed shifted hands!  Certainly, there were men in the midst of these 
revolutionary times who saw that matters had changed. Thus Henry Neville, a member of 
parliament, exclaimed to the House of Commons in 1658
xxxvi 
“The Commons, till Henry VII, never exercised a negative vote. All depended on the Lords. In 
that time it would have been hard to have found in this house so many gentlemen of estates. The 
gentry do not now depend on the peerage. The balance is in the gentry. They have all the lands.” 
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As an elected Parliament gained power over the monarch, the conditions for a constitutionally 
limited government were finally in place.
xxxvii The Glorious Revolution formalized this state of 
affairs, and enshrined the concept that taxation could not be arbitrary, and required the consent of 
the peoples’ representatives. Less than a century later, this principle was reiterated in the 
American Declaration of Independence.  
A Summary 
Let us recapitulate. There were three critical steps on the way to limited government. The 
first was the decline of the coercive power of the great nobles. This ensured that raw physical 
might no longer determined economic outcomes, and that ownership was not the prerogative of 
an inefficient few. The second was emergence of an intermediate class, the gentry, who were not 
just economically powerful as a class, but also efficient exploiters of the land they owned. The 
third was the existence of Parliament as a coordinating institution. Without it, the dispersed 
gentry would have struggled to assert its new economic power. Thus, the Parliament, weak in the 
Tudor years when the gentry was emerging, became strong when the gentry became wealthy. 
The power of the Parliament was also strengthened by the commonality of interests among the 
gentry. Most derived income from land and many owned land that was previously expropriated 
from the Catholic Church.   
Thus the emergence of property rights in England was due to a fortuitous combination of 
factors. Were all of these factors necessary? James Harrington, an Englishman who was a 
contemporary of Oliver Cromwell, and studied the sources of power in his 1656 book, Oceana, 
believed the redistribution of land through the great Tudor expropriations (and the land sales by 
Stuart monarchs as they attempted to fund their extravagances) was solely what changed the 
balance of power. This belief in property as the fount of power – because those who have   24
property have the ability to pay armies -- is clearly enunciated in one of Harrington’s 
pamphlets
xxxviii  
All government is founded upon overbalance in propriety. [i.e., governmental power derives 
from property; the man or men whose property exceeds (overbalances) the total wealth of others 
in the state controls its government] 
 
If one man hold the overbalance unto [over] the whole people in propriety, his propriety causeth 
absolute monarchy. 
 
If the few hold the overbalance unto the whole people in propriety, their propriety causes 
aristocracy or mixed monarchy. 
 
If the whole people be neither overbalanced by the propriety of one, nor of a few, the propriety 
of the people (or of the many) causeth the democracy or popular government.   
 
There is a long tradition for the belief that widely distributed property leads to democracy 
and civil society. Some societies have suggested maximum limits on what can be owned while 
others have suggested minimum limits: The Roman Republic had an `agrarian law’ that limited 
the land any one person could own. Jefferson’s draft constitution for Virginia, written in 1776, 
required that each adult have 50 acres of land.
xxxix Yet the argument that property is power is, at 
some level, circular. To claim that property leads to power is to presuppose that the government 
respects allocations of property. Else why could the government – which enforces property rights 
-- simply not declare the property rights of the rebels null and void if it feels that they would 
fund armies against the government?  
If we were to stress a single most important factor in the emergence of property rights, it 
would not just be the wider distribution of property but also the economic (or social) ties 
between the property and the owner, which is all that would persist in an atmosphere of anarchy. 
Thus Harrington omits a vital step in his arguments: The sale of seized land and the flourishing   25
subsequent land market led to property being held by those who could manage it much better. It 
was this – the economically efficient holding of property -- that enhanced the security of 
property, because the efficient holders had the economic power to defend their property against 
others. In addition, of course, the ability for the gentry to coordinate action through Parliament 
helped convert their dispersed, but substantial, economic power into political power. 
Would it have been enough to open a market for land? Was the expropriation of the great 
lords and the monasteries necessary for the wider distribution of power? While it is hard to 
answer such counterfactual questions categorically, we believe the expropriations, despite 
violating property rights, somewhat paradoxically helped build future limitations on the 
monarchy. For one, the expropriations did redistribute wealth directly spreading economic 
power. More important, the lords and monasteries owned a significant portion of the land in their 
localities. They were local monopolists. Even if smaller properties were more efficiently 
managed, like all monopolists they may have preferred holding on to their land, managing it 
inefficiently, but squeezing monopoly profits out of the local populace. Thus a market for land 
may not have moved land into more efficient hands, were it not for the expropriations, which 
were a sort of anti-trust action. 
  Our argument suggests why government was much more participatory in the cities than 
in the nation states. In the city-states, the dominant source of wealth was not land but trade and 
manufacture. The surplus generated by these activities was clearly closely tied to the expertise, 
incentives, and relationships of the owner of the business, much as land was tied to the 
commercial farmer. It made economic sense to respect property rights within the city and to give 
citizens (a word that originates from the French cite and was originally applicable only to   26
residents of a city) the sense of security by allowing them to participate in government.  As the 
old saying goes “Stadtluft macht frei” or “City air makes free”. 
  Clearly, the cities grew along with business, and there is no reason to believe that respect 
for property was highly developed in the early life of a city. But over time, the quantum of 
business grew and businessmen demanded, and obtained, respect for property, as well as 
participation in city government. 
  In the nation states, by contrast, the dominant source of revenue was land. So long as 
property holdings were concentrated, the nation state could not commit to respect property. Even 
if manufacture or trade started up, it would be hard for the nation state to show respect for 
business property when business output formed only a small fraction of total output. Thus it was 
only after the breakup of the feudal estates or after extensive land reforms that the group of 
gentry emerged who not only were strong advocates of the institution of private property, but 
also forced government to respect it. This then paved the way for competitive industry to 
emerge. Of course, once industry became sufficiently important, the pattern of land holdings 
might become less important to the security of property. 
  English history offers some evidence of this sequence. One of the rights the king 
attempted to usurp for himself as industries grew was the right to grant industrial monopolies. 
Consider the following case, which vividly demonstrates that these monopolies contributed to 
the insecurity of property, the arbitrary power of the king, and the ruin of economic activity. In 
1614, a scheme was concocted to
xl 
“take from the Merchant Adventurers [a trading company] their rights to export unfinished 
woolen cloth to the Netherlands and to give to a new company the exclusive right to export 
cloth…It was estimated that the export of entirely finished cloth…would bring in an additional 
profit of 600,000 to 700,000 pounds a year to those engaged in the cloth trade. Of this the king 
was to have 300,000 pounds for his grant of the franchise to the new company. The 
Dutch…refused [to let in] the English finished cloth, and the new company came to a quick end.   27
Yet before the Merchant Adventurers could recover their old rights, which they did at a cost of 
between 60,000 and 70,000 in bribes to James’ officials, the entire cloth trade had been 
disorganized…As late as 1620 the English merchants were exporting only half as much cloth as 
they had sent abroad in 1613.”     
 
  Parliament saw the danger to the security of property (and its own power) from these 
monopolies, and in 1624, passed the Statute of Monopolies, which forbade the issuance by the 
king of patents of monopoly to individuals except in the case of new inventions. The anti-
monarch Parliament that served between 1640 and 1660 went further, and virtually ended the 
practice of granting monopolies to corporations, as well as individuals.
xli So in addition to 
protecting the rights of land owners, the power of the landed gentry acting through Parliament 
placed constraints on the arbitrary powers of the king over industry. 
Eventually, of course, industry became the source of security to property. Even though 
the landed gentry were instrumental in breaking the power of the monarchy, eventually they used 
Parliament to further their own interests. The emergence of small and medium sized farmers in 
the 16
th and 17
th century – the Yeoman revolution – gave way to Parliamentary enclosures and 
the Landlord revolution in the 18
th and 19
th century. While the former movement was progressive 
and enhanced productivity, the latter redistributed wealth to the newly politically powerful.
xlii 
But industry had come into its own  -- as evidenced by the battle over tariffs on food that it 
eventually won – and power shifted to new defenders of property. 
 Other Countries 
  We have focused on England because it is the canonical example of the emergence of 
constitutionally limited government. It is useful to see briefly whether other countries that 
developed constitutional government fit the mold.   28
    France is often the canonical counter to Britain. Historians have puzzled over why 
France did not achieve constitutionally limited government until the 19
th century. One reason is 
simply that the nobility and the church in France were all too strong before the French 
Revolution. Even a powerful king like Louis XIV only played the grandees off, one against the 
other. When he died they regained their power.
xliii Since French kings could not suppress the 
great lords, they tried to enlist the peasantry’s support by protecting their property rights against 
encroachment by the lords.
xliv So the peasantry in France held a substantial portion of the land, 
but in small, relatively inefficient holdings.
xlv Land sales also did not take off, in part because the 
king had no incentive to make alienation easy for that would allow the peasants to sell out to, or 
be dispossessed by, the lords, and in part because, unlike England, there was no initial grand sale 
of expropriated land to jump-start the land market. So the gentry did not emerge as a class. 
Finally, since the king levied and collected taxes through a centralized bureaucracy directly from 
the peasants, he really had no need to summon any form of Parliament on a regular basis. 
   The French Revolution and the confiscation and sale of the properties of the church and 
the aristocracy had some of the effect in France that the Tudor expropriations had in England. It 
reduced the land and power of the nobility, strengthened the then miniscule French gentry as 
well as the rich peasant farmer, created a national market for land and food by abolishing internal 
impediments to trade, and created a more permanent institutional structure for representative 
government. As a consequence, the productivity of French agriculture increased substantially in 
the nineteenth century.
xlvi The political and economic effects of these changes were undoubtedly 
critical in fostering the late, but substantial, French industrial revolution.  
  If our arguments hold generally, then they should not be valid just historically but also 
more recently. Very crudely, our arguments suggest that in predominantly agricultural countries,   29
the security of property – clear laws facilitating the ownership of property and its sale as well as 
a judiciary and a government that respects them and enforces rights -- should be low where land 
ownership is highly concentrated. Not only do big landowners have the ability to defend their 
property through private armies or through their influence over the local apparatus of the state, 
they have no incentive to see the infrastructure of a free market emerge to challenge their 
power.
xlvii  
  This leads us to a final question. If wider (but not too wide) distribution of land led to 
participatory politics and respect for private property, why did every country not undertake land 
reform? Why till 1861 were the vast majority of Russians serfs, tied to the land and without 
protection from their overlords, and from the government? Why did it take the French 
Revolution, the Napoleonic conquests, and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 for land to be 
distributed in Continental Europe in a way more conducive to intensive commercial farming and 
greater respect for property rights?    
One reason may be the nature of the land in some countries. Some lands lend themselves 
to intensive farming, while others lend themselves to a mode of agriculture such as plantations 
that is more extensive. This may partly explain why Costa Rica has had a more democratic 
history than Columbia. The effects of the initial distribution of land may persist long after the 
distribution is no longer optimal as we noted in the introduction to the book. For example, even 
after the emancipation of indentured or slave labor reduced the profitability of the large Latin 
American haciendas, the owners did not disband them. The need to maintain a ready pool of 
unskilled, poorly educated, labor may explain why many of these hacienda-dominated countries 
did not pursue universal education and economic and social rights as vigorously as others did.
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  The argument that the necessary technology of production does not permit an ownership 
pattern favorable to the emergence of strong property rights applies not only to land but also to 
industry. When industry consists of large monopolies, which exist only because the government 
affords them privileges, the government is likely to have little respect for property. For example, 
firms in extractive industries have value largely because of their rights to extract, and really do 
not utilize huge amounts of human ingenuity. In countries that are abundant in natural resources 
– such as Zaire – the government can extract large amounts of money simply by withdrawing a 
mining privilege from one company and auctioning it off to another. Of course, eventually 
bidders realize they will have to factor in the cost of future bribes that will be needed to keep 
their privileges. The outcome, however, is that the government will have little incentive to 
respect property rights. Only a few countries have overcome the curse of being richly endowed 
with mineral resources. 
  But the most important reason for why countries did not attain the appropriate 
distribution by design may be that the self-interest of the government and the nobility did not 
permit land reform, even if it would benefit the country as a whole. Certainly, an individual lord 
could not hope to gain by dividing up his land and selling the pieces to the peasants who farmed 
it. If other lords did not follow suit and force an eventual change in the climate of property rights 
enforcement, our revolutionary lord would find that the peasants he had sold land to enjoyed 
even less security of tenure now that the lord was not present to protect them. Moreover, any 
wealth the lord gained from sale would itself be up for grabs, now that he could not hold out the 
prize of grain or below-market-rents to enlist the support of his peasants in battle.
xlix 
The sovereign might also not have had the incentive to move to distribute land widely. 
After all, even if property rights became more secure, and the land became more productive, he   31
would lose power. In many cases, it would be in the monarch’s self interest to continue coercive-
extractive policies, even if detrimental in the long run for the country -- as Louis XV is famously 
supposed to have said, “France will last my time.” 
If initial distributions of land holdings tend to persist in the absence of forcible reform, 
the legacy of history may explain why some countries, or even parts thereof were lucky, while 
others not. For example, Northern Italy and Southern Italy are extremely different in their 
economies, Northern Italy being much more progressive than Southern Italy. Estates were much 
larger in the South and the peasants far poorer. A number of historical factors including the 
Norman conquest of the South in the eleventh century and the greater devastation caused by the 
plague in Southern Italy in the fourteenth century could account for the differences in land 
distribution.
l  In turn, these differences may partly explain the disparity in economic progress 
between the North and the South that persists even today. 
The legacy of historic land distribution patterns seems to be important in India. Areas in 
which property rights over land were given over to large landlords by the British in colonial 
times have significantly lower agricultural investment, lower agricultural productivity, lower 
rates of literacy, and higher rates of infant mortality in recent years.
li The growing disparity 
between the booming West and South of India and the relatively stagnant Central and Northeast 
areas is probably, in some measure, a legacy of history.  
Similarly, some former colonies of European powers developed stronger respect for 
property rights earlier than others: The initial European settlers migrated en masse to a colony if 
the climate was hospitable and the land disease-free – leading to the emergence of a group of 
yeoman farmers who formed a solid base for representative, constitutionally bound government. 
By contrast, land holdings in a colony were much more concentrated, and industry much more   32
extractive, if the land was inhospitable so that only the minimum number of Europeans migrated 
to oversee large holdings worked by native labor.
lii These latter countries would have had to 
await the emergence of a viable manufacturing and trading class to establish secure property 
rights, but the emergence of that class would itself be held back by the absence of property rights 
and finance. 
Finally, some governments care more about their own power than the prosperity of their 
citizens, giving us examples of the consequences of inappropriate redistributions of property. 
Fearful of their role in supporting the institution of private property, Stalin exterminated the 
yeoman farmers in Russia, the Kulaks, in the 1920s and 1930s and gathered their land into large 
collective farms. The collectivization of Russian land caused enormous losses in agricultural 
production – but served the intent of removing the yeomanry, a strong force for private property 
completely from the Russian landscape. Government could move ahead with communism 
unopposed.  
More recently, formerly socialist economies have attempted to figure out how to 
distribute state owned property to private citizens so as to ensure a smooth transition to 
capitalism. Some economists have argued that it does not really matter who owns the property, 
all that matters is that property finds its way into private hands.
liii Our arguments suggest 
otherwise. Property in the wrong hands, especially if concentrated, can be very detrimental both 
to reducing the power of the state and to the emergence of free markets. The Russian Republic 
provides one clear illustration. In an underhand deal to win support for the 1996 Presidential 
election, Boris Yeltsin agreed to give a few powerful operators some of the best Russian 
companies at bargain basement prices. This was just the most egregious of events by which 
Russian industry and finance became dominated by a few, whose primary competence was   33
contacts rather than business acumen. It is little wonder that these “businessmen” came to be 
known as oligarchs, reminiscent of the reactionary feudal lords that stood in the way of 
capitalism.  
Not only do these oligarchs oppose the development of free markets and free access to 
finance, they also offer little countervailing force to a powerful state. Since their empires are not 
built on competence, they can be taken away as easily as they were acquired. The government of 
Vladimir Putin has, in fact, cut some of these oligarchs down to size and assumed significant 
power. Whether the oligarchs are replaced by others in a game of merry-go-round, or whether 
the oligarchs are done away with so that a truly competent and competitive business class 
emerges is a matter to be seen. In that lies the future of Russian democracy and free market 
enterprise in that country.     
Conclusion 
Historically, the greatest obstacle to the development of free markets, especially free 
financial markets, was the rapacity of governments. We have argued that the emergence of a 
class in England that individually was large enough to farm commercially and take risks, but was 
not individually strong enough to protect itself, created the demand for a constitutionally limited 
state. Institutions like Parliament and the administrative machinery served to coordinate this 
class and give it political power, which then resulted in the limitations on government it sought. 
These safeguards were extremely important to ease the path of government finance. 
Unlike with land or industrial assets, most financial assets are held passively – the holder has no 
great expertise in generating value from those assets. Since the government suffers only a loss of 
reputation if it expropriates the cash or gold held by its citizens, or if it repudiates the debt it 
owes them, the holders of financial assets are the first to be targeted by a government in need. It   34
is rare that a troubled modern government takes the land farmers own, or the machines firms 
have, to pay its bills, but it is perfectly willing to pay public creditors only a fraction of the 
amount it owes. Finance therefore has to come within the perimeter of defenses built against the 
government by other forms of property for it to flourish.  
But when investors feel safe, a country can benefit greatly because it can borrow to fund 
national enterprise, and not be limited by what it can raise in the short run through taxes. As 
historian Richard Ehrenberg, writing in the early part of the twentieth century, puts it, “England 
would not have been the Great Britain of today, it would not have conquered half the world, if it 
had not incurred a national debt of 900,000,000 pounds between 1693 and 1815.” 
liv 
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